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MONASKY V. TAGLIERI: THE SUPREME COURT’S
INTERPRETATION OF HABITUAL RESIDENCY AND ITS
IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
Abigail Leann Heeter*
Abstract
The most common form of kidnapping is when a child is taken by a parent
from a co-parent. When the kidnapping parent is native to another country, navigating the international family courts can be more than challenging. Because of
this, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
created an order that all signatory countries must return an abducted child to their
location of habitual residency. However, the Hague Convention declined to define what habitual residency meant, leaving it up to the determination of the
Courts.
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted this issue in the landmark case
of Monasky v. Taglieri. Based on precedent from other countries and the drafter’s
intent of the international agreement, habitual residency is based on a factual
inquiry as to where the child is “more than just transitory and it is customary,
usual, and of the nature of a habit.” This decision does not encompass the many
challenges that are faced with international familial relationships. Particularly the
Court failed to fully consider instances of domestic violence and how this decision forces many families to be returned to their abusers.
This note will focus on this decision and its impact on the hundreds of
thousands of families attempting to recover a wrongly taken child across international borders and the parents who flee from unsafe circumstances with their
children. The first section will discuss the legal background of the Hague Convention and its previous interpretation in the U.S. courts, leading up to the decision in Monasky. The second section will discuss the holding in Monasky and
how the Supreme Court arrived at this decision. Next, it will discuss the Court’s
reasoning for this decision. Finally, the fourth section will discuss the impact of
this decision on international custody issues and how this will affect children
who are victims of international child abduction and the parents that are fighting
international custodial disputes.
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Introduction

The term kidnapping typically invokes an image of a child being taken by
someone they do not know. However, each year, hundreds of children are victims
of international kidnapping, taken by someone they likely know quite well – their
parent.1 International parental kidnapping occurs when a non-custodial parent or
a parent involved in a tumultuous marital dispute takes the child out of the country of which it is a resident.2 This not only devastates the family left behind, but
also can have an adverse effect on the dislocated child that is taken from their
familiar environment.3 When children are wrongfully taken abroad, they often
face many challenges that can be traumatizing, such as language barriers, differences in customs, separation from friends and family, and difficulties completing
education in an unfamiliar environment.4 Because of the negative effect that in1 International Parental Kidnapping, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (last updated May 5, 2021), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/international-parental-kidnapping; see also Smita Aiyar, International
Child Abductions Involving Non-Hague Convention States: The Need for a Uniform Approach, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 277, 277 (2007).
2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 1.
3 Id.; Jeffrey L. Edleson, Ph.D. et al., Multiple Perspectives on Battered Mothers and Their Children
Fleeing to the United States for Safety: A Study of Hague Convention Cases, NAT’L CRIM. JUSTICE
REFERENCE SERVS. (Dec. 2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232624.pdf (site funded by
the U.S. Department of Justice but not published by the U.S. Department of Justice and does not represent their points of view that are expressed by the authors and does not reflect U.S. policies or
positions).
4 A Law Enforcement Guide on International Parental Kidnapping, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1,
3 (July 2018), https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh176/files/pubs/250606.pdf.
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ternational child abduction causes, experts consider it to be a form of child
abuse.5
In 1999, it was estimated that 203,900 children were victims of a familial
kidnapping that year.6 Of this reported number, 53 percent were reported to be
abducted by their biological father, and 25 percent of these children were abducted by their biological mother.7 Given this information, parental kidnapping is
substantially the most common type of familial kidnapping.8
In these cases, because the child’s kidnapper is a parent, locating the child can
be easier than in a case of abduction where the perpetrator’s identity is unknown.
However, this does not correlate to the success rate of returning the child to its
resident country. In most cases, the abductor takes the child to a country that is
easily reached by airline and the courts in that country are unwilling to enforce
foreign custody orders. Commonly, this is a country where they may have previously resided and where they have family to support them.9 These elements provide legal obstacles for the custodial parent to have their child returned to them.
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(“Hague Convention”) offers an opportunity of relief for these families of internationally abducted children.10 The Hague Convention provides that any member
country must judicially order an abducted child that is being kept in their county
back to the country in which the child has habitual residence, if invoked by a
custodial parent within the first year of the child’s abduction.11 A monumental
decision regarding the Hague Convention was recently decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States on February 25th, 2020 in the landmark case of
Monasky v. Taglieri.12 In this case, the Supreme Court created a test for determining habitual residence for children who were victims of international abduction, but too young to testify about their life prior to their kidnapping.13 The
Court held that the habitual residence of a child is determined by a totality of the
circumstances and not categorical elements.14 The Hague Convention does not
define how to determine habitual residency, but instead dictates that habitual residence is where a child is ‘at home.’ This was the first instance that the U.S.
5 International Parental Child Abduction, COMM’N ON SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR. (2016), https://
www.csce.gov/issue/international-parental-child-abduction.
6

H. HAMMER
ESTIMATES

TIONAL

7

Id.

8

Id.

ET AL.,
AND

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILDREN ABDUCTED
CHARACTERISTICS 2 (2002).

BY

FAMILY MEMBERS: NA-

9

Janet Chiancone et al., Issues in Resolving Cases of International Child Abduction by Parents,
JUVENILE JUST. BULL. 1, 2 (Dec. 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/190105.pdf.
10 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M,
1501 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
11

Id. at art. 10. See also HAMMER

12

Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S.Ct. 719 (2020).

13

Id.

14

Id.
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Supreme Court expressly provided a test for determining what ‘at home’
means.15
II.

Analyzing the Legal Landscape of International Parental Kidnapping

In 1993, Congress first enacted the International Parental Kidnapping Crime
Act, making it a federal crime for a parent to remove or attempt to remove a child
from the U.S. or retain a child from outside the U.S. with obstruction of another’s
custodial rights.16 This, however, only provided a remedy to families in the U.S.
The issue becomes much more drastic when dealing with other countries’ familial laws. When the child crosses international borders, many countries do not
want to attempt to enforce a U.S. parental agreement or custody order, or even
accept them as binding. For example, in Ahmed v. Naviwala, the mother had been
awarded sole custody of her children by a U.S. Court but allowed their father to
take the children to Saudi Arabia for a vacation.17 Once in international territory,
the father refused to return the children to the U.S. and he would not let their
mother contact them.18 Eventually, the father retained a court order from a Saudi
Arabian court granting him sole custody, despite the previous order from the U.S.
court and without notifying the mother of the proceedings, depriving her the opportunity to represent herself.19 This conflict of court orders was able to happen
because Sadia Arabia is not a member to the Hague Convention and did not have
an obligation to enforce a U.S. custody agreement.20 Often, in circumstances
such as these where one parent holds a child hostage in another country, the other
parent’s only chance to get their child back is to invoke the Hague Convention if
possible, forcing a government in a foreign jurisdiction to take judicial action.
A. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction
The Hague Convention was adopted in 1980 at the fourteenth session of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law with the purpose of providing a
procedure for the return of children that have been abducted and retained across
15 Hague Convention, supra note 10; see also Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980
HCCH Child Abduction Convention, HCCH 1, 32. https://assets.hcch.net/docs/a5fb103c-2ceb-4d1787e3-a7528a0d368c.pdf; see also Elizabeth Slattery, Monasky v. Taglieri, A.B.A. (Feb. 25, 2020), https:/
/www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/preview_home/volume/47/issue-3/article11/.
16 International Parental Kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (2003).
17 Matter of Ahmad v. Naviwala, 306 A.D.2d 588, 589 (N.Y.App.Div. 2003) (wherein the mother
testified that she was in communication with the children while they were abroad over a three-month
period and then suddenly the father terminated all contact between the two parties).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 590.
20 Enforcing custody agreements in countries that are not signatories to the Hague Convention will
not be discussed in depth in this note, but many of the same issues of enforcement still overlap. See
Aiyar, supra note 1, at 319.
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international borders.21 As international travel began to increase, so did international relationships, presenting new issues such as children who possessed citizenship in multiple countries because of international parents.22
Due to the prevalence of international relationships, the United States
(“U.S.”), joining approximately 75 other countries, signed the Convention on December 23, 1981.23 However, the Convention did not go into effect in the U.S.
until Congress enacted the International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(“ICARA”) on July 1, 1988.24
If a party invokes the Hague Convention within one year of the child’s abduction, the judge in a Convention party country must order the child be returned to
its country of habitual residence.25 However, if more than one year has passed,
the child’s return is discretionary and the judge can deny the Hague Convention
because it is arguable that the child’s new ‘habitual residence’ is the country
where it has resided for the past year.26 Additionally, if the child is of a certain
age and maturity, the Court can take into account which country in which it
would prefer to be.27
To have a case fall under the protection of the Hague Convention, the child
must have been a habitual resident of a country that is a party to the Convention
and is now being wrongfully retained in a country that also is a party to the
Convention; the removal of the child was wrongful and a violation of a parent’s
custodial rights; and, the child is under the age of 16.28 The purpose of the Con21 Hague Convention, supra note 10; see also Perez-Vera, supra note 15 (stating that a custody battle
should occur in a location that is most comfortable for the child, making a need for a jurisdictional
determination and the matter of custody is not one for international courts).
22 Ericka A. Schnitzer-Reese, International Child Abduction to Non-Hague Convention Countries:
The Need for an International Family Court, 2 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 4 (2004); see Aiyar, supra note
1, at 277.
23 Letter of Submittal fr. George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, to President Ronald Reagan, 51 Fed.
Reg. 10,496 (Mar. 26, 1986). U.S. Hague Convention Treaty Partners, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE- BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-Abduction/abductions/hague-abduction-country-list.html (listing signatories to the 1980 Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction to include Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada,
Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Republic of Macedonia,
Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino,
Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, territories of the United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe) [hereinafter Letter to Ronald Reagan].
24 International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 (1988).
25 Important Features of the Hague Abduction Convention- Why the Hague Convention Matters, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE- BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-Abduction/abductions/legain-info-for-parents/why-the-hague-convention-matters.html.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.; see also Letter to Ronald Reagan, supra note 23 (noting that two or more countries can choose
to extend the coverage past the age of 16 and can use discretion to determine to implement the convention retroactively).
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vention is not to adjudicate the best interests of the child, but instead to ensure
that the child is returned to the country that has jurisdiction over the child, so a
custody matter can be properly heard.29 Because of this, the abducting parent
does not have a great number of available defenses.30 This can be particularly
difficult for the abductor in cases where they took the child when fleeing from
abuse, or when the abductor believes they are acting in the best interest of the
child for other reasons.31 Determining a child’s habitual residence for the purposes of appropriate jurisdiction over custody claims is crucial under the Hague
Convention.32
The recent decision in Monasky v. Taglieri is monumental to Hague Convention jurisprudence because the Supreme Court has only decided a limited number
of cases in relation to the Convention.33 Prior to this decision, the Court had not
expressly defined what ‘habitual residence’ meant.34 The Court has only discussed habitual residence in the case of Abbot v. Abbot, where it reiterated the
importance of determining where the child is acclimated but did not give a definition.35 Lower courts have used the ‘shared intent’ standard to look at the facts
of the case and determine what the shared intent of the parents was regarding
where they would raise their child, in order to determine the child’s habitual
residence.36 The absence of a steadfast definition left great deference to U.S.
courts to interpret how to determine habitual residence for a young child that
could not testify as to where it felt acclimated, and where the parents’ shared
intent could not be deciphered.
III.

Monasky v. Taglieri

This section will discuss the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Monasky v.
Taglieri. First, this section will provide a factual background of the case. Second,
it will discuss the procedural history of the case and the opinions of the lower
courts before the case reached the Supreme Court. Finally, it will discuss the
holding of the Supreme Court and how the Justices reached their decision.
Michelle Monasky, a U.S. citizen, and Domenico Taglieri, an Italian native,
were both residing in the U.S. when they began a relationship and eventually
29

Chiancone et al., supra note 9.
Id.
31 Edleson et al., supra note 3, at 24 (finding that most parents who abduct their children internationally are fleeing volatile situations from a partner or co-parent).
32 Id.
33 Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 724; Slattery, supra note 15.
34 Slattery, supra note 15. (Some critiques claim that too explicit of a definition would be too harmful
to this area of jurisprudence as it would create too strict of an analysis that may not give judges enough
deference).
35 See Abbot v. Abbot, 560 U.S. 1 (2010).
36 See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (2001) (holding that there must be given significant weight to
the intent of the parents when determining habitual residence); Ahmed v. Ahmed, 867 F.3d 682 (2017)
(holding that the abducting parent has the burden to prove the shared intent of the parents or where the
child is more acclimatized).
30
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married in 2011.37 Two years after they wed, the couple relocated to Milan, Italy,
where they both found work and appeared to intend to reside indefinitely based
on their actions.38 Shortly after this, Monasky alleged that Taglieri began to become physically abusive towards her, causing her to be fearful for her life, and
that he would force himself onto her.39 After one of these incidents, Monasky
discovered that she was pregnant.40 Taglieri subsequently moved from Milan by
himself and the couple were effectively separated for the duration of her pregnancy.41 During this period of time, Monasky made plans to return to the U.S. by
looking for new employment, divorce lawyers, and logistical arrangements for
moving.42 However, she did not inform Taglieri of her plans to move and allowed preparations for them to raise the child in Italy together to continue.43 By
the time that Monasky went into labor with their child, the relationship was so
deteriorated that Taglieri refused to take her to the hospital to give birth.44 Their
baby, referred to as A.M.T, was born in February 2015 and in the effort of raising
the child, the two attempted to reconcile.45 However, in late March, after another
physical argument, Monasky left Taglieri and went to an Italian police station to
report the incident.46 After reporting, Monasky then fled to the U.S. with A.M.T.
and went to her mother’s residence in Ohio, fearing for the safety of her eightweek-old newborn.47
After discovering that his wife and child were missing from Italy, Taglieri
filed a petition with the Italian courts to grant him sole custody of A.M.T.48
Because Monasky was unaware of these proceedings and thus unable to represent
herself, Taglieri was awarded his request by the Italian court.49 Subsequently,
Taglieri filed an action with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio for the return of A.M.T. to Italy under the Hague Convention pursuant to
U.S.C. § 9003 (b).50 In analyzing the Hague Convention claim, the District Court
applied the standard that a child is a habitual resident where it has become “acclimatized” to its surroundings; however, when a child is too young to testify where
it is acclimatized, the court must look to the evidence on the record to determine
37

Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 724.
Id.
39 Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 724.; see also Monasky v. Taglieri, 907 F.3d 404, 406 (6th Cir. 2018).
40 Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 724.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Monasky, 907 F.3d at 406.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 724 (Monasky testified that she feared for her daughter’s safety after Taglieri made explicit threats towards A.M.T. when she would not stop crying and refusing to allow
Monasky to change her diaper when needed).
48 Id.
49 Monasky v. Taglieri, 907 F.3d 404, 407 (6th Cir. 2018).
50 Id.; U.S.C. § 9003 (b).
38
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the “shared intent” of the parent’s choice of location to raise the child.51 The
District Court found that Monasky and Taglieri had a shared intent to raise
A.M.T. in Italy and that Monasky made no definite plan to return to the U.S.,
ordering A.M.T.’s return to Italy in accordance with the Hague Convention.52
Monasky appealed this decision, and the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
granted a petition for a rehearing en banc and held that the District Court applied
the correct legal standard and made no clear errors in determining A.M.T.’s habitual residence, affirming the judgment.53 Monasky then appealed to the Supreme Court.54
A. How The Supreme Court defines habitual residency
Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court for the purpose of clarifying the
standard of habitual residence.55 Habitual residence is not explicitly defined by
the Hague Convention.56 However, the Convention’s explanatory report stated
that this phrase was chosen intentionally to instruct the use of a factual inquiry,
while also reserving the ability of courts to have “maximum flexibility” when
making this determination.57 One of the purposes of the Hague Convention is to
have uniformity in making these determinations.58 Because of this, the Supreme
Court looked to what other treaty signatories had done, the consensus being those
signatories applied a fact-driven inquiry into the particular circumstances of each
case.59 The Supreme Court cited the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court determination that a child’s habitual residence “depends on numerous factors. . . with the
purposes and intentions of the parents being merely one of the relevant factors. . .
the essentially factual and individual nature of the inquiry.”60 The highest courts
of the European Union, Canada, and Australia also used similar tests for determining habitual residence.61 Monasky argued that the Court should look to the
51 Taglieri v. Monasky, 2016 WL 10951269 6 (2016) (using the “shared intent” standard to determine
A.M.T.’s habitual residency was proper in Italy).
52 Taglieri v. Monasky, 2016 WL 10951269 6 (2016)
53 Monasky v. Taglieri, 907 F.3d 404, 411 (6th Cir. 2018).
54 Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 728.
55 Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 728.
56 Id. at 726; see also S. Treaty. Doc. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 I.L.M, 1501 (1980) [hereinafter S. Treaty].
57 Id. at 727; see also Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 HCCH Child Abduction
Convention, HCCH, 1, 32 https://assets.hcch.net/docs/a5fb103c-2ceb-4d17-87e3-a7528a0d368c.pdf; see
also Anton, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 30 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 537, 544
(1981); see also P. Beaumont & P. McEleavy, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction
89, 89-90 (1999).
58 U.S. Dept. of State – Bureau of Consular Affs., Important Features of the Hague Abduction Convention - Why the Hague Convention Matters, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-Child-Abduction/abductions/legain-info-for-parents/why-the-hague-convention-matters.html (last
accessed Dec. 23, 2021).
59 Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 727-728.
60 Id. at 728 (citing A, [2014] A. C., at ¶ 54).
61 S. Treaty, supra note 56; see also OL v.PQ, 2017 E. C. R. No. C-111/17, ¶ 42 (holding that the
habitual residence of a child must be established, taking account all of the circumstances of the case);
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actual agreement between the parties; however, she was unsuccessful in citing to
a single country that adopted her “actual-agreement proposal.”62
Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that to not “thwart the objectives and
purposes of the Convention,” they would adopt a factual inquiry approach similar
to the other signatory countries.63 The Court held that the proper approach was to
look at “a wide range of facts other than an actual agreement, including facts
indicating that the parents have made their home in a particular place, can enable
a trier to determine whether an infant’s residence in that place has the quality of
being habitual.”64 They defined the standard for habitual residence is present
when the residence is “more than just transitory” and it is “customary, usual, and
of the nature of a habit.”65 The Court found that to make a determination of
habitual residency courts must look to extrinsic evidence, inducing a fact-sensitive inquiry, not one that is categorical.66
The Court also held that appeals of habitual residence determinations were to
be reviewed on a clear-error basis to further promote the purposes of the Convention of a swift resolution so that a proper custody dispute can be fought in the
proper jurisdiction.67 Because of this, the lower court’s judgment was to be given
great deference.68 Accordingly, because the District Court looked at all the facts
relevant to the dispute, the Supreme Court found this sufficient to affirm their
judgment.69
The District Court looked at the totality of the circumstances to determine that
A.M.T. was born into a marital home in Italy and that there was no definitive
plan to return to the U.S.70 Monasky argued that there was both an “absence of
settled ties in Italy” and that there were “unstable” conditions for A.M.T. in Italy.71 However, the court found the circumstances of the marriage, as unstable as
they were, to be insufficient evidence to find that Italy was not A.M.T’s habitual
residence.72 The district court thus found that Italy was the best location for
Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, [2018] 1 S.C.R., at 421, 423-430, ¶¶ 43, 48-71, 424 D. L. R.
(4th), at 410-417, ¶¶ 43, 48-71 (holding that a determination of habitual residence must look to all
relevant considerations); LK v. Director-General, Dept. of Community Servs., [2009] 237 C.L.R. 582,
596, ¶35 (Austl.) (holding that an attempt to identify a set list of criteria that bear upon where a child is
habitually resident would deny the simple observation that the question of habitual residence will fall for
decision in a very wide range of circumstances); LCYP v. JEK, [2015] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 798, 809-810, ¶ 7.7;
Punter v. Secretary for Justice, [2007] 1 N. Z. L. R. 40, 71, ¶ 130 (N.Z.).
62

Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 727-728.

63

Id. at 728.

64

Id. at 729.

65

Id. at 726 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1176 (5th ed. 1979)).

66

Id at. 726.

67

Id. at 730.

68

Id. at 731.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 731.

72

Id.

Volume 18, Issue 1

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

103

Monasky v. Taglieri

A.M.T to return to continue custody proceedings based on the Hague
Convention.73
The decision to affirm was unanimous, with two separate concurring opinions.74 Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion stating that he agreed with the
Court’s determination regarding habitual residence as a fact-driven inquiry that
requires taking all the circumstances into account.75 However, Thomas believes
that the Court should have reached this decision by looking at the plain meaning
of the text as opposed to the precedent that the other signatory countries set
forth.76 Because other countries have only recently agreed on this approach in the
past ten years, Thomas believes the Court may be relying on this reasoning too
heavily.77 He states that, by relying on other countries precedent, the Court risks
being “persuaded to reach the popular answer, but possibly not the correct
one.”78 He proposes that a more uniform approach that better conforms to the
Convention’s purposes would be to follow the Hague Convention text’s intention, such as the Convention’s preamble and explanatory report, that also results
in the same conclusion.79
Justice Alito also wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that the question of
habitual residence should be a factual inquiry, which can be determined without a
parental agreement, and that the District Court’s decision should be upheld because it deserves deference.80 However, Justice Alito disagrees with Justice
Thomas – that the U.S. should not align our definition of habitual residence with
our fellow Hague Convention signatories, and rather that this should be used as a
guidepost for the Supreme Court to create its own definition of ‘habitual residence’ that is more satisfying for addressing future Hague Convention issues.81
Due to the broad range of definitions of ‘habitual residency,’ Alito finds that this
is a factual inquiry, where the standard of review should look at abuse of discretion, not clear error.82
IV. Analyzing the Effects of International Parental Abduction and
Monasky v. Taglieri’s Impact
This section will analyze the Supreme Court’s decision in Monasky v. Taglieri.
First, it will discuss the defenses that can be raised under the Hague Convention
and how the Court’s decision impacts their application in future cases. Second, it
73
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will discuss the grave risk defense and why it is so closely intertwined with
Hague Convention petitions. Third, it will discuss how the Court reached its decision and the goals of this decision. Finally, this section will discuss how the
Court could have analyzed this case in a different way based on Justice Thomas’s
concurring opinion.
The effects of abduction to a child can be devastating. Extensive research has
shown that the result of being taken from a parent has long-term effects on the
child, and the length of separation and location of where the child was taken can
impact how severe these effects are.83 Victims who are abducted for an extended
period of time, which in some cases is long enough for the child to lose memory
of the parent from whom they were abducted, results in increased rage and grief
which manifests in anxiety, aggressive behavior, poor peer relations, distrust, and
resentment.84
Additionally, in cases where children were relocated to countries where they
were not familiar with the language or culture, these children often experienced
developmental delays.85 In many instances, a kidnapping parent takes their child
back to the country that parent considers home but is also a location that their
child has never been. In a recent study, left-behind parents that were victims of
international parental kidnapping reported that the abducting parent usually took
the child to a country that spoke the parent’s native language (reported by 83
percent), had family that resided there (reported by 76 percent), lived in that
country as a child (reported by 69 percent), or considered that their primary place
of residence while growing up (reported by 68 percent).86 Situations where a
parent abducted their child to a country with which the abducting parent was
familiar, but the co-parent was not, could present disadvantages to both the leftbehind parent and the abducted child.
Because of the severity of the damage that abduction can cause a child in their
formative years, child abduction is viewed by some to be a form of child abuse.87
Additionally, the parents that are left behind when their child is abducted can be
dealing with monumental grief caused by the loss of their child.
A. Defenses under the Hague Convention for parental child abduction
There may be certain circumstances where abduction is justified. A parent
may find a large array of reasons to relocate internationally with their child, particularly when they fear for their own safety or the safety of their child. Because
of this, the Convention allocated three defenses that can be raised in a petition
that can prevent the child from being returned to the left-behind parent when the
83
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case is adjudicated.88 First, if the child has “attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views,” then the child can
testify as to which parent it would prefer to live with.89 The child’s choice is not
conclusive but it is highly instructive to a court making the discretionary determination of what is best for the child.90 Second, if over a year has elapsed after the
child has been abducted the court is encouraged to look at if it would be beneficial to uproot the child yet again or allow the child to establish roots in where
they have been relocated.91
Finally, the third defense involves the ‘grave risk’ provision in Article 13(b) of
the Hague Convention that allows the court to consider whether there is a grave
risk that, if returned, the child would be exposed to physical or psychological
harm, or place the child in an intolerable situation that the child should not be
returned to their habitual residence.92 This defense has instigated the most litigation surrounding its application due to the difficulty of determining what constitutes grave harm, and there has been considerable inconsistency of this
determination between state, district, and federal courts.93
In Blondin v. Dubois, the Second Circuit expressed that neither inconvenience,
economic hardship, nor a child’s preference constitute grave harm that could prevent repatriation of a child; however, evidence of physical or psychological harm
would constitute such risk of grave harm. The court described this dichotomy
with the goal of encapsulating the protection from abuse by custodial parents.94
Blandin instructs that courts may look to factors such as where the child is settled
and where it would experience the least amount of unsettling activity, to determine if psychological harm would occur in a new environment.95 The Ninth Circuit has also weighed in on this analysis and described that grave risk exists only
if the child will personally suffer serious abuse if returned.96 Meanwhile, one
District Court has held that a history of abuse to the petitioner is not sufficient to
meet this standard and that the abuse must be suffered, prior to abduction, by the
88 Jennifer Baum, Ready, Set, Go to Federal Court: The Hague Child Abduction Treaty, Demystified,
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N (July 14, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrens-rights/articles/2014/ready-set-go-fed-court-hague-child-abduction-treaty-demystified/; see also
Hague Convention, supra note 10.
89 Hague Convention, supra note 10.
90 Id.
91 Id. art. 12; see also Lozano v. Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 18-19 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing
“why courts have equitable discretion under the Hague Convention to order a child’s return even after the
child has become settled”).
92 Hague Convention, supra note 10; see also Sara Ainsworth, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: A Child’s Return and the Presence of Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL FOR JUDGES 2015, (Oct. 2014), https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/manuals/domViol/
appendixG.pdf (discussing that courts have traditionally found the grave risk of harm must be directed at
the child and they must have experienced it prior to abduction).
93 Ainsworth, supra note 92.
94 Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 167-68 (2nd Cir. 2001) (holding that the lower court properly
applied Article 13(b), as repatriation of children would subject them to a ‘grave risk of psychological
harm’ due to previous abuse by a parent).
95 Id. at 156.
96 Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005).
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child.97 In contrast, another District Court held the opposite, that spousal abuse is
a factor in determining whether there is a grave risk to the child upon return.98
Consequently, there is no clear test for determining the proper standard to prove
grave harm, and thus its application is not trustworthy.
B. The intersection between domestic abuse and Hague Convention petitions
A history of abuse is common in Hague Convention cases, and often is the
instigating factor as to why a parent flees a country with their child without the
other parent’s consent.99 A recent study funded by the U.S. Department of Justice
that examined over 300 Hague Convention cases found that a significant number
of the abducting parents were mothers fleeing violence from the child’s father.100
Additionally, from this survey, out of 30% of left behind parents admitted to
being accused of abuse by their spouse or family prior to having their child taken
from them.101 As seen in the Monasky v. Taglieri decision, under the Court’s
current analysis, an abused parent may be ordered to return their children to their
abusers.102 This approach neglects the fact that batterers who abuse their partners
often abuse their children as well.103 Essentially, the mothers in these cases are
being ordered to place their children in situations that have the potential to be
dangerous.104 The decision ordered that an abducting parent who had reported
abuse to authorities return her child to their abuser.105 In making its determination, the Court ruled that habitual residency was not an inquiry that considered
surrounding circumstances to be analyzed as circumstantial evidence leading up
to the abduction, such as abuse of the fleeing parent.106
In Monasky, A.M.T.’s mother fled because she feared for her safety based on
the abuse that she had faced for years, making her attempted defense of the Article 13(b) protection viable.107 However, the Court held that because A.M.T. had
not previously experienced any physical abuse at the hands of her father, she was
97

Tabacchi v. Harrsion, No. 99 C 4130, 2000 WL 190576, at *12-13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2000).
Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1057-58 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
99 Litigating International Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, NATIONAL CENTER
FOR
MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN & KILPATRICK TOWNSEND 53 (2012) https://
www.missingkids.org/content/dam/missingkids/pdfs/publications/pdf3a.pdf.
100 Edleson et al., supra note 3, at 9.
101 Id. at 22.
102 Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 729 (Taglieri testified that she experienced abuse at the hands of Monasky,
yet the Supreme Court reasoned that under the habitual residency test A.M.T. was to be returned to Italy).
103 Misha Valencia, When Protecting Your Children is a Crime, DAME MAGAZINE (Feb. 10, 2020)
https://www.damemagazine.com/2020/02/10/when-protecting-your-children-is-a-crime/.
104 Id.
105 Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 729.
106 Id. (The Court stating, “[w]e doubt, however, that imposing a categorical actual-agreement requirement is an appropriate solution, for it would leave many infants without a habitual residence, and
therefore outside the Convention’s domain. Settling the forum for adjudication of a dispute over a child’s
custody, of course, does not dispose of the merits of the controversy over custody. Domestic violence
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107 Monasky, 140 S.Ct. at 729.
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not in danger of grave harm by being returned to her father in Italy, and thus
Monasky could not be protected by Article 13(b).108 The Supreme Court declined
to consider Monasky’s history of abuse by Taglieri as meeting the standard of
danger of grave harm that would apply to A.M.T. because A.M.T. herself had not
experienced it, despite verbal threats that Taglieri made referencing physically
harming A.M.T.109 In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
A.M.T.’s familial situation was “tumultuous” but determined that this did not
impact a determination of her habitual residence.110 While this decision was in
accordance with the Hague Convention’s purpose of returning the child to its
habitual residence to continue custody proceedings if necessary, this objective
can be problematic when a child’s safety is of concern, as it was for Monasky
here.
Monasky was even successful in reporting this abuse to Italian police, which
resulted in Taglieri being held accountable in court, where he was found liable
for assault and battery and subsequently ordered to pay $100,000 in damages.111
Despite this conviction, the Supreme Court ruled that this shouldn’t be a factor in
determining where A.M.T. should live.112 In a study of Hague Convention cases,
85.7% of the women fleeing from abuse party to a Hague Convention petition
had reported the abuse to at least one resource.113 Reporting these incidents of
abuse is already difficult for women living with a co-parent in a country foreign
to them because these reports are often met with skepticism and, in some cultures, abuse is accepted behavior.114 Even if such reports are taken seriously and
acted upon, they do not have a significant effect on a Hague Convention analysis,
according to the Supreme Court, because this does not pose a “grave risk” specifically to the child.115
The biggest issue with the Supreme Court’s conclusion is that there is evidence that abusers who batter their partners often abuse their children as well.116
Sarah Gundle, a psychotherapist who specializes in treating trauma survivors
stated she has found that “if a parent has abused their partner, the risk increases
significantly to the child. . . if the [father] can no longer control the mother, their
anger and rage is very often displaced on the children.”117 The complexities of
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custodial battles often do not adequately protect children from an abusive parent.
Even in domestic custody disputes, a study by the Center for Judicial Excellence
found that in the short period between June 2009 and January 2010, there were
75 children murdered by an abusive father involved in custody proceedings.118
Furthermore, many of the countries where the U.S. repatriates children lack comprehensive domestic violence legislation or otherwise have ineffective legal enforcement of these laws when they are present.119
The Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of how a court is to determine habitual residency of a child fails to fully encompass the evidence of what could
constitute grave harm to a child. By neglecting the father’s history of abusing the
mother, ostensibly because it does not directly impact A.M.T., the Court is ignoring the statistical evidence of how these patterns of abuse overlap. Ordering
A.M.T.’s return to Italy despite awareness of the father’s abusive behavior likely
puts her at risk of grave harm. The ability of Courts to step in to save children
from potentially dangerous situations should not be undervalued. U.S. courts
need to look at the issue of habitual residency more broadly and should incorporate the use of extrinsic evidence to properly determine where a child is most
safe. Doing so would not frustrate the purposes of the Convention as it would fall
under the grave harm defense that exists to help ensure safety when undergoing
Hague Convention analyses.
Another difficulty presented by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Hague Convention is that there is no guarantee that, once returned to the child’s
location of habitual residence, the custodial parent will comply with subsequent
proceedings as purported.120 Even if the disobeying parent is held in contempt of
court, courts may find difficulty enforcing such court orders across international
borders.121 It was found that many mothers who were engaged in an international
custody battle lost contact with their children when fathers refused to comply
with visitation orders from foreign courts.122 Concerningly, the abducting parent
may not have standing in foreign court systems where they are not citizens. The
visiting parent is often at a disadvantage due to customary and language barriers
that are presented when attempting to litigate in a foreign court system.
V.

Impact

The determination of a child’s habitual residency is particularly important in
cases where the child itself cannot testify because it is too young. While the
118 Cara Tabachnick, Failure to Protect: The Crisis in America’s Family Courts, THE CRIME REPORT
(May 6, 2010), https://thecrimereport.org/2010/05/06/failure-to-protect-the-crisis-in-americae28099sfamily-courts/.
119 Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic Violence, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 624 (2000) (citing the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, United
States Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights (1999)).
120 Christine Powers Leatherberry, International Custody 101: Helpful Tips for Parents, CONNATSER
FAM. L. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://connatserfamilylaw.com/international-custody-101-helpful-tips-for-parents/.
121 Id.
122 Edleson et al., supra note 3, at 178.

Volume 18, Issue 1

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

109

Monasky v. Taglieri

recent Monasky decision is narrowly applied to children abducted by a parent
when they were too young to discern their place of residency, this issue is nevertheless widespread among Hague Convention petitions.123 International parental
abduction is one of the only crimes against children that is more likely to occur
the younger the child is.124 A 1999 study found that 44 percent of children abducted by a family member were younger than six years old.125 At this age,
children are not able to properly identify or testify to their surroundings prior to
abduction, creating the need for an unbiased court to make the determination for
the family.126 Based on these statistics, the Supreme Court’s decision will have
an implication on many future U.S. Hague Convention petitions.
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s decision to make a factual inquiry of a
child’s location of habitual residency, and not to look just to what the parents
purport to be the agreement of where they had previously decided to raise the
child, is monumental – such was the precedent in the U.S. prior to Monasky.127
This may positively impact cases where the intent is difficult to discern or shared
intent by the parents is not possible as they could not have a meeting of the
minds. However, the change of precedent can negatively impact cases where an
explicit agreement is made between parents that is later broken by one party.
While a court would still be obligated to look at explicit agreement as a factor of
the case, it would not be dispositive but rather included alongside other relevant
evidence.
Overall, this recent decision will have a large impact on litigation surrounding
Hague Convention petitions adjudicated in U.S. court systems. The new framework for determining a child’s habitual residence is now to be looked at using a
more holistic approach in an effort to follow the Convention’s purposes by objectively finding where the child should return. However, this approach is still not
perfect. There is room for error in many cases where there may be reasons that
the abducting parent fled, such as abuse, and where the parents may have had an
agreement on where the child should be raised that was breached in abduction.
A. International Uniformity of Application in the Hague Convention
The purpose of the Convention was to create a uniform approach of application among signatory countries, which, as a member, the U.S. must strive to
achieve.128 As mentioned above, uniformity is particularly important in international kidnapping cases because of the high risk of returning children to an abusive parent. Additionally, compliance with these purposes promotes other
123
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countries to follow suit and avoid international disputes, keeping these disputes
in the respective custodial courts of each country. This idea is based in the value
of comity, the voluntary recognition by courts of one jurisdiction of the laws and
judicial decisions of another for the purpose of international harmony.129
In Monasky, the Supreme Court indicated that it approached the case with a
main goal of comity, achieving this by giving the opinions of other signatory
country “considerable weight.”130 The Supreme Court cited precedent from the
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, and New Zealand, all of whom
indicated that determining habitual residence is a factual inquiry in which the
Court is entitled to look at all relevant circumstances, and that an actual agreement between the parents is not dispositive.131 Following this analysis, the U.S.
Supreme Court agreed that, in order to avoid thwarting the purposes of the Convention, it would apply the same approach.132
This attempt of complying with speculation of how other signatories would
approach this issue is beneficial in pursuing the goal of comity. However, as
Justice Thomas expressed in his concurrence, the Supreme Court could have
reached the same conclusion based on its own judgment.133 By not following
other countries’ precedent, the Court could have created a test for habitual residency using the explanatory materials and the language of the Convention itself
to reach a conclusion that better follows the purposes of the treaty itself. Additionally, the Court could have tailored the test to better fit the unique position of
the U.S. regarding the adjudication of these petitions. The U.S. government submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of neither party, advocating that the
Convention used the phrase habitual residence intentionally because it was different than both the terms domicile and nationality- which would have resulted in
too rigid of an application.134 The term habitual residence instead allows for the
flexibility of familial circumstances.135 The Supreme Court, nevertheless, attempted to create a narrower definition despite this opinion. By creating too narrow of an exception for the habitual residency rule, it appears as though the Court
placed higher value on comity with other nations over the safety of children that
go through U.S. court systems.

129 Comity, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/comity (last
visited Jan. 9, 2022); Comity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (ONLINE LEGAL DICTIONARY 2DED.) (last visited Jan. 9, 2022).
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VI.

Conclusion

Every year, a significant number of children are wrongfully taken across international borders by a family member, leaving another family member behind.136
While there are various reasons why this happens, the child’s safety is what is
most important when adjudicating these cases – something the 1980 Hague Convention of International Kidnapping strives to ensure by mandating that signatories return children to the location of the child’s habitual residency. The
instability already present in the child victim’s life is clear, but can be further
aggravated by other factors, such as the duration of relocation or familiarity with
the culture in which they are forcibly immersed. This situation can become even
more grievous if the child is suffering abuse at the hands of a parent.
In Monasky v. Taglieri, the Supreme Court held that habitual residency is not
only established solely by an agreement between a child’s parents, but by looking
at the totality of the circumstances to include discerning where the parents intended to raise the child. By doing this, however, the Supreme Court neglected to
consider certain evidence such as the kidnapper fleeing an abusive family member, holding that this did not constitute grave risk to the child unless abuse happened directly to the child—an enumerated defense for international kidnapping
that would have allowed the child to stay in the U.S. This decision was made in
accordance with the goal of comity through adhering to precedent established by
other signatory nations while simultaneously neglecting possible indicators of
what constitutes grave risk to a child.
This decision will likely have a large impact on families involved in international relationships hoping to invoke the Hague Convention, but where an implicated child is too young to testify as to its place of habitual residency This
change will likely be positive for those who hope to get a wrongfully taken child
returned, but could negatively impact those who are fleeing abusive partners.
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